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LIGHT DEBT USERS AND HEAVY DEBT USERS IN THE RESTAURANT 
INDUSTRY A DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
Zheng Gu 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the wide diversity in financing of 
publicly traded restaurant firms in the United States. Fisher discriminant functions 
were estimated and firm features differentiating light debt users from heavy debt 
users were identified and analyzed. The study has found that managerial control is 
the most important contributor to the diversity in debt use in the restaurant indus- 
try. Size and type of operation also explain the diversity. The analysis shows that 
small full-senice restaurant firms with low managerial ownership tend to use less 
debt, while large economy/buffet or fast-food restaurant firms under tight mana- 
gerial control are likely to be heavy debt users. 
Introduction 
Capital structure is the composition of a firm's financing sources. Essentially, it is the 
mix of debt and equity. Capital structure has been a controversial topic in corporate fi- 
nance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose the irrelevance of capital structure to firm 
value under some strict assumptions of a perfect capital market. However, with the as- 
sumptions relaxed, the no-tax and no-bankruptcy assumptions in particular, capital 
structure does matter in firm valuation and an optimal capital structure is possible (Bax- 
ter, 1967; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Weston & Brigham, 1990). Moyer, McGuigan, and KTetlow (1990) point out that capital 
structure may affect the market value of a firm. While the tax shield of debt increases 
firm value, bankruptcy and agency costs offset the benefits of debt. A change in capital 
structure may change the firm's tax shield, bankruptcy, and agency costs and hence its 
value. Capital structure decision is one of the centrally important decisions that face the 
management of a hospitality firm. Optimizing capital structure, as Andrew and Schmid- 
gall (1993) point out, is essential to the long-run success of the hospitality firm. 
The factors that determine capital structure have been well debated in finance litera- 
ture. In hospitality research, however, capital structure has been insufficiently discussed. 
While several studies have explored the capital structure determinants of hotels 
(Kwansa, Johnson, & Olsen, 1987; Sheel, 1994), there is a lack of academic research on the 
capital structure of restaurant firms. In the restaurant industry, during the 1989-1991 re- 
cession in the United States, excessive debt use aggravated the financial hardship caused 
by sluggish sales. Many restaurants went bankrupt. Wood (1992) points out that many 
restaurant firms that had been able to borrow in the past may have eventually reached a 
jundure at which selling stocks became necessary. Capital structure has become a more 
important issue for the industry. 
I 
Within the restaurant industry observed capital structures differ substantially across t 
firms. While some restaurant firms use little debt, some are deeply indebted. At the end 
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of 1993, among the 75 public restaurant companies recorded in COMPUSTAT, the debt 
ratio, which is the ratio of debt to total assets, ranged from 6.82% to 145.2%. Two firms 
had debt ratios greater than one, due to excessive borrowing and cumulative operation 
losses. What factors have caused such a wide diversity in debt use within the restaurant 
industry? This study is designed to explain the financing diversity in the restaurant in- 
dustry. In particular, it focuses on those firms heavily indebted versus those using little or 
no debt. The study attempts to identify factors that may discriminate between heavy 
debt users and light debt users. These factors, if identified, may provide an explanation 
to the diverse financing behaviors in the restaurant industry. 
Background 
In finance literature, commonly discussed capital structure determinants include as- 
sets structure, business risk, growth, size, profitability, and managerial control (Weston & 
Brigham, 1990). Myers (1984) suggests that profitable firms should have less cumulative 
need for external financing and that profitable firms in slow-growth industries should 
have low debt ratios. Titman and Wessels (1988) propose that large diversified firms tend 
to use more debt and profitable f irms tend to use less debt. Scott (1972) concludes that 
industry, as a proxy of business risk, should have an influence on the capital structure. 
Business risk affects a firm's tolerance of financial risk and hence its financing policy. The 
effect of managerial control on capital structure is more complicated. According to 
Weston and Brigham (1990), when the management has voting control, it may choose to 
use more debt to avoid diluting the control. Its financing preference, however, may 
switch to new equity when the firm is financially weak and is facing default risk. 
Empirically Scott and Martin (1975) found that capital structure differed across in- 
dustries and that large firms used more debt than small firms. In Gupta's (1969) regres- 
sion analysis, growth companies were found to have higher debt to assets ratios. In a 
cross-nation regression analysis, Toy Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and Beekhuisen (1974) 
found that growth was positively related to debt ratio and that profitability had a nega- 
tive impact on corporate debt use. The multivariate regression analysis by Titman and 
Wessels (1988) found that profitability led to lower debt leverage, but the impact of 
growth on debt use was insighcant. Friend and Lang (1988) found that debt ratios of 
publicly held firms increased with the fraction of stocks owned by managerial insiders. 
Previous empirical studies on capital structure have focused on large firms in 
manufacturing industries. Few empirical studies on capital structure have been docu- 
mented in hospitality research. Kwansa, Johnson, and Olsen (1987) found no significant 
relationship between sample hotels' debt /equity ratios and all the explanatory variables 
including growth, profitability, and size in their across-firm model. On the other hand, in 
Sheel's (1994) regression model, which used samples of hotel firms and manufacturing 
firms, all independent variables, including size, profitability, and operating risk, were 
significantly related to the debt to assets ratio. In a comparative study on financial ratios 
of different types of restaurant firms, Gu and McCool(1993/1994) found sighcant dif- 
ferences in debt ratios across different types of restaurant firms. Their study however, 
did not investigate the factors that had caused the difference. An investigation of the 
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causes of the financing diversity in the restaurant industry4 nonmanufacturing indus- 
try mainly composed of small firms-will not only enhance a weak link in hospitality 
research but also enrich the empirical literature on capital structure in general. 
Methodology 
Most of the previous empirical studies on capital structure, including the two on the 
hotel industry's capital structure, used linear regression models to examine the relation- 
ship between debt use and a variety of factors. Many studies failed to find a linear rela- 
tionship between debt use and some or all of the factors. The nonexistence of a linear 
relationship, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between 
debt use and those factors. Furthennore, a critical assumption of regression is the 
normality of data. Business data, however, are often strongly skewed (Summer & Peters, 
1974). With severe data non-normality present, linear regression may lose its robustness 
and regression results can be distorted (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988). 
Different from previous empirical studies, this study uses the multivariate Fisher 
discriminant function (Fisher, 1936) to identify and analyze the variables that distinguish 
light-debt restaurant firms from heavy-debt restaurant firms. The Fisher function does 
not have to make any distributional assumptions. Research has shown that although 
dummy variables do not follow a normal distribution, their use in Fisher discriminant 
functions can help improve the classification (Afifi & Clark, 1984). Goldstein and Dillon 
(1978) illustrate the use of discrete variables in discriminant models. In this study if the 
two groups of restaurant firms a- found to have some distinct features that distinguish 
them from each other, these features may be the relevant factors that affect their financing 
decisions and may explain the wide financing diversity in the industry. Whether debt 
use is linearly related to the factors is unimportant and is not the interest of the study. 
The Fisher discriminant function for classifying restaurant firms into heavy and light 
debt users is denoted as: 
where Z is a linear combination of all dassifylng variables or features-XI through &. The 
value of the dividing point of the two groups is calculated as: 
where 2, is the mean Zvalue of the light-debt group and % the mean Z value of the 
heavy-debt group. After the coefficients, a through g, are estimated and the discriminant 
function is established, the Z value of any restaurant firm can be calculated and compared 
with the dividing point C. The classification depends on whether the Zvalue is greater or 
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The features of a restaurant firm with a DR of 0.57 may not be very different from 
those of a restaurant firm with a DR of 0.55. This study is more interested in those firms 
with wide difference in debt use in the industry-those heavily relying on debt and those 
using little or no debt-and their distinct features. Therefore, it further sorted out firms 
with debt exceeding two-thirds of the financing (DR > 0.67) as heavy debt users (12 
firms) and those with debt less than one-third of total financing (DR c 0.33) as light debt 
users (32 firms). A second Fisher discriminant function was estimated for the 44-firm 
sample. Table 1 provides a list of the sample restaurant firms and their classifications. 
Table 2 shows the types of the restaurant firms under different classifications. 
The operation types of restaurant firms served as a proxy for business risk. The Sam- 
ple restaurant firms were divided into four categories of operations: full-service upscale, 
full-service family, economy/buffet, and fast-food. Operation types were determined 
based on descriptions in the COMPACT DISCLOSURE and confirmed by phone calls to 
companies when descriptions were vague. Three dummy variables, TI, T2, and T3, were 
used to represent full-service upscale, full-service family and economy/buffet opera- 
tions respectively. Fast-food restaurant firms were assigned zero value for all the three 
dummy variables. 
In investigating the relationship between debt use and profitability, previous studies 
used operating profits or earnings before interest and taxes as the profitability variable 
(Toy et al., 1974; Titman & Wessels, 1988). In reality, many firms use operation-generated 
cash flow as an internal financing source to substitute for debt. Therefore, this study used 
the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets (OCF) as the profitability variable. OCF was 
lagged for a year, as a firm's financing deasion was likely to be affected by its previous 
operating results. Total assets (TA) and percentage of managerial ownership (MC) were 
used as size and managerial control variables. The growth variable (G) was represented 
by the three-year growth of sales (1991-1993). 
The nondurnmy independent variables were checked for normality in normal proba- 
bility plots. While OCF and MC appeared normal, strong skewness was observed in the 
distributions of G (with a mean of 0.254 and a median of 0.119) and TA (with a mean of 
$347 million and a median of $75.9 million). The non-normality of the data justified the 
use of discriminant analysis. Table 3 and Table 4 present the means of the nondummy 
I independent variables of the light-debt and heavy-debt firms and the p values of the 
I 
E: t-tests on their differences. 
Estimated Fisher Models 
Statistical program SAS was used for estimating Fisher discriminant models. Dis- 
criminant stepwise procedure was employed for selecting the variables that could con- 
tribute to the differentiation of the two groups. Statistical signhcance levels for a vari- 
able to enter the model (F-to enter) and to be removed from the model (F-to remove) 
were set at a = 0.15, as suggested by Afifi and Qark (1984). Therefore, variables with p 
values less than 0.15 would be retained. 
The Jouml  of Hospitality Financial Management 
Table 1 
Sample Restaurant Finns and Classification 
Note: With cutoff DR = 0.56 (75 firms), firms followed by ' are heavy debt users. The rest are light 
debt users. With cutoff DR set at DR < 0.33 and DR > 0.67 (44 firms), firms preceded by 1 are light 
debt users and firms preceded by 2 are heavy debt users. The rest are medium debt users. 
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Table 2 
Types of Restaurant Firms under Different Debt User Classifications 
Type Light Debt Heavy Debt Light Debt Heavy Debt 
User (DR < 0.56) Users (DR > 0.56) Users (DA < 0.33) Users (DR > 0.67) 
Full-service upscale 12 2 5 1 
Full-service family 18 2 13 1 
Economy/ buffet 13 7 8 4 
(Model 1) 
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(sample) and 13.6% (jackknife). In contrast with Model 2, Model 1 makes more rnisclassi- 
fications with 20 sample errors (26.7%) and 21 jackknife errors (28%). 
The p value under each variable indicates the significance level of its marginal con- 
tribution to the classification. Model 1 has three retained classifylng variables, MC, TI,  
and T2, all significant at the 0.05 level. The other four variables, TA, OCF, G, and T3, not 
significant at the 0.15 level, were excluded by the stepwise procedure. In Model 2, be- 
sides MC, T l ,  and T2, TA was retained as a classifylng variable. The other three variables, 
G, OCF, and T3, were excluded for not meeting the a = 0.15 requirement. In Model 2, 
while MC is significant at the 0.001 level and TA, s i e c a n t  at the 0.1 level, T1 and T2 are 
not sigruhcant at the 0.1 level. They were retained in the model because of the a = 0.15 
rule. Goldstein and Dillon (1978) suggest that liberal inclusion a levels, between 0.15 and 
0.25, should be considered in the discriminant stepwise procedure and the formal proba- 
bilistic stopping rules should not be interpreted as stringent tolerances. Rigid stopping 
rules could significantly reduce the classwng power of a discriminant model. For the 
&firm sample, an inclusion rule of a = 0.1 would have excluded T1 and T 2  and re- 
duced the D2 to 1.78. The sample and jackknife error rates would have risen to 27.3%. 
In comparison with Model 1, Model 2's higher accuracy does not necessarily mean 
that it is a superior model. It is not surprising that Model 2 has lower error rates. The 
strider screening criterion of light and heavy debt users for the &firm sample makes the 
two groups more distinguishable. Besides, TI and T2, not significant at the 0.1 level, 
weaken the explanatory power of the model. On the other hand, in the 75-firm sample, 
the "grey area" of sample firms with DRs around 56 percent makes it hard for Model 1 to 
discriminate between the two groups. The high error rates of Model 1 are not necessarily 
indicative of an inferior model. It is not uncommon that discriminant functions with sig- 
nificant D2 have error rates around 25%. For example, the discriminant function of the 
depression study by Afifi and Clark (1984) has an error rate of 28.9%. The discriminant 
model for children's riskiness presented by Stevens (1992) has an error rate of 26.3%. Fur- 
ther, all the retained variables in Model 1 are significant at the 0.05 level, making it more 
convinang when used for explanatory purposes. The higher error rate of Model 1 does 
not necessarily suggest that Model 1 is an inferior model. 
Model accuracy and error rates are not of major interest in this study. This study does 
not pursue a discriminant model with a minimum error rate. Its purpose is to use the 
1 
t variables retained in the model to explain the diversity in debt use in the restaurant in- dustry. In particular, the &firm sample is meant for analyzing firms with even wider 
diversity in debt use-those with DRs greater than 0.67 versus those with DRs less than 
0.33 in the restaurant industry, rather than for achieving higher accuracy. 
Discussion of the Results 
The signs and statistical sigruficance of individual variables of the estimated model 
deserve attention. Afifi and Clark (1984) point out that for a Fisher discrirninant function, 
comparisons of the variables that have positive coeffidents with those that have neg- 
ative coefficients can be revealing. The sign of the coefficient of the Fisher discrirninant 
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1989-1991 recession. Full-senice upscale restaurant firms were more adversely affected 
by the recession than other types of restaurants. According to Riehle (1991), in 1990, 
this group's operating cash flow was 7.4% of sales revenue, the lowest of all sectors in 
the industry, whereas its interest expense was 1.2% of sales revenue, the highest of the 
industry. The recession may have changed the group's financing preference from debt 
to equity. 
Financing theory has suggested that firms exposed to higher business risk may want 
to use less debt to reduce further exposure to finanaal risk (Weston & Brigham, 1990; 
Martin et al., 1990; Rao, 1992). Previous evidence indicates that firms generating stable 
cash flows over the business cycle tend to have higher debt ratios (Moyer et al., 1990). 
Targget (1986) points out that debt-financing proportion and perceived business risk 
move in opposite directions in the United States. The high likelihood of full-service res- 
taurant firms' being classified as light debt users found in this study suggests that these 
firms may have higher perceived business risk due to the recession and hence have 
changed their financing behavior. 
The estimated discriminant models show that growth does not play a role in differ- 
entiating debt users in the restaurant industry. The findings confirm the results of Titman 
and Wessels (1988) but negate what was found by Toy Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and 
Beekhuisen (1974). The exclusion of the growth variable from both models suggests that 
restaurant firms have not wanted to or been able to excessively rely on debt to finance 
their growth since the 1989-1991 recession. As Wood (1992) points out, many restaurant 
firms, small ones in particular, have already reached their debt capacity. Increased debt 
financing for growth may have been matched by new equity issuance and retention, thus 
making the debt proportion unchanged and the impact of growth on debt ratio insigrufi- 
cant. In fact, most of the restaurant firms retain their earnings as an internal finanang 
source. In 1993, of the 75 restaurant firms in the sample, only 15 paid dividends. Most of 
them were penny dividends. 
The exclusion of OCF from the Fisher discriminant models was not a surprise, since 
there was no significant difference in the mean OCF ratios between different groups of 
debt users (Tables 3 & 4). Finance theory has suggested that profitable firms may use less 
debt because operating cash flow, an internal financing source, can substitute for external 
borrowing. Previous empirical studies (Toy et al., 1974; 'l3tman & Wessels, 1988) found 
i profitability negatively related to debt use in manufacturing industries, because a signifi- 
i cant gap in operating profits existed and higher operating profits were found in low-debt 
i firms. In this study the two groups had mean OCF ratios not significantly different from 
each other. The similarity in their mean OCFs could make the impact of OCF on debt use 
homogenous and result in its insigruficant role in classifying debt users. 
The sigruficant negative relationship between profitability and debt use observed in 
other industries is not likely to occur in the restaurant industry because of its fast growth. 
The 75 restaurant firms had an average sales growth of 25.4% from 1991 through 1993, 
much faster than the nation's GDP growth. Myers (1984) proposes that profitable firms in 
a slow-growth industry are likely to use less debt because of lower cumulative need for 
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market-value debt ratios, a new discriminant function may provide a better explanation 
of the diversity of the capital structure in the restaurant industry. 
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